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Rivi 61:
 
[[Immanuel Kant]] katsoi, että mieli muovaa havaintomme aika-avaruudelliseen muotoon. Kant keskittyi brittiläisiltä [[empirismi|empiristeiltä]] (kuten Lockelta, Berkeleyltä ja [[David Hume]]lta) saamaansa ajatukseen siitä, että kaikki mitä voimme tuntea ovat mielen vaikutelmat tai ilmiöt (''[[fenomena]]''), jotka ulkoinen maailma, joka voi olla olemassa tai olematta itsenäisenä, luo mieliimme. Mielemme ei voi koskaan havaita ulkoista maailmaa suoraan. Kant kutsui filosofiaansa [[transsendentaalinen idealismi|transsendentaaliseksi idealismiksi]] ja empiiriseksi realismiksi.<ref name="CE-Idealism"/>
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Kant emphasized the difference between things as they appear to an observer and things in themselves, "… that is, things considered without regard to whether and how they may be given to us … ."<ref>''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', A 140</ref>
 
{{Quotation|… if I remove the thinking subject, the whole material world must at once vanish because it is nothing but a phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of ourselves as a subject, and a manner or species of representation.|''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' A383}}
 
Kant's postscript to this added that the mind is not a [[blank slate]] (contra [[John Locke]]), but rather comes equipped with categories for organising our sense impressions. This Kantian sort of idealism opens up a world of abstractions (i.e., the universal categories minds use to understand phenomena) to be explored by reason, but in sharp contrast to Plato's, confirms uncertainties about a (un)knowable world outside our own minds. We cannot approach the ''[[noumenon]]'', the "Thing in Itself" ([[German language|German]]: ''Ding an Sich'') outside our own mental world. (Kant's idealism goes by the counterintuitive name of ''[[transcendental idealism]]''.)
 
Kant distinguished his transcendental or critical idealism from previous varieties:{{Quotation|The dictum of all genuine idealists, from the [[Eleatic]] school to Bishop [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], is contained in this formula: “All knowledge through the [[senses]] and [[experience]] is nothing but sheer [[illusion]], and only in the ideas of the pure [[understanding]] and [[reason]] is there [[truth]].” The principle that throughout dominates and determines my idealism is, on the contrary: “All knowledge of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in experience is there truth.”|''[[Prolegomena]]'', 374}}
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==== Saksalainen idealismi ====
Rivi 76 ⟶ 67:
 
Saksalainen idealismi on nimitys idealistiselle liikkeelle, joka vaikutti saksalaisessa filosofiassa 1700-luvun lopulla ja 1800-luvun alkupuolella. Se kehittyi [[Immanuel Kant]]in töiden pohjalle 1780- ja 1790-luvuilla ja liittyi läheisesti [[romantiikka]]an ja [[valistusaika|valistusajan]] vallankumoukselliseen politiittiseen ajatteluun. Saksalaisen idealismin tunnetuimpia ajattelijoita olivat [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]], [[Friedrich Schelling]] ja [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]]. Siihen vaikuttivat merkittävästi myös [[Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi]], [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]] ja [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]].
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[[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Johann Fichte]] denied Kant's [[noumenon]], and made the claim that consciousness made its own foundation, that the mental ego of the self relied on no external, and that an external of any kind would be the same as admitting a real material. He was the first to make the attempt at a presuppositionless theory of knowledge, wherein nothing outside of thinking would be assumed to exist outside the initial analysis of concept. So that conception could be solely grounded in itself, and assume nothing without deduction from there first, what he called a [[Wissenschaftslehre]]. (This stand is very similar to [[Giovanni Gentile]]'s [[Actual Idealism]], except that Gentile's theory goes further by denying a ground for even an ego or self made from thinking.)
 
[[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]], another philosopher whose system has been called ''idealism'', argued in his ''Science of Logic'' (1812-1814) that finite qualities are not fully "real," because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them. Qualitative ''infinity'', on the other hand, would be more self-determining, and hence would have a better claim to be called fully real. Similarly, finite natural things are less "real"--because they're less self-determining--than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities, and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or merely natural objects are fully real, is mistaken. Hegel called his philosophy ''[[absolute idealism]]'', in contrast to the "[[subjective idealism]]" of Berkeley and the "[[transcendental idealism]]" of Kant and Fichte, which were not based (like Hegel's idealism) on a critique of the finite. The "idealists" listed above whose philosophy Hegel's philosophy most closely resembles are Plato and Plotinus. None of these three thinkers associates their idealism with the epistemological thesis that what we know are "ideas" in our minds.<ref>An account of Hegel's critique of the finite, and of the "absolute idealism" that Hegel bases on that critique, can be found in Robert M. Wallace, ''Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God'' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).</ref>
 
It is a noteworthy fact that many commentators on Hegel, and even some who admire Hegel's philosophy, fail to distinguish his type of idealism from Berkeley's and Kant's.<ref>A book that is devoted to showing that Hegel is neither a Berkeleyan nor a Kantian idealist is Kenneth Westphal, ''Hegel's Epistemological Realism'' (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).</ref> Hegel certainly intends to preserve what he takes to be true in Kant's idealism, in particular Kant's insistence that ethical reason can and does go beyond finite "inclinations".<ref>See Wallace, ''Hegel's Philosophy of Reality, Freedom, and God'', chapter 3, for details on how Hegel intends to preserve something resembling Kant's dualism of nature and freedom while defending it against skeptical attack.</ref> But Hegel doesn't endorse Kant's conception of the "thing-in-itself," or the type of epistemological argument that led Kant to that conception. Still less does Hegel endorse Berkeley's notion that things exist only by being perceivers or being perceived. The guiding idea behind Hegel's "absolute idealism" is the observation, which he shares with Plato, that the exercise of reason enables the reasoner to achieve a kind of reality (namely, self-determination, or reality as ''oneself'') that mere physical objects like rocks can't achieve. By giving this observation a central role in his thinking, Hegel contributes to a philosophical tradition, beginning with Plato, that has been obscured by the modern preoccupation with the epistemological problem of the subject's access to the "external world."
 
==== Schopenhauer ====
 
In the first volume of his ''Parerga and Paralipomena'', [[Schopenhauer]] wrote his "Sketch of a [[History]] of the Doctrine of the [[Ideal]] and the [[Real]]". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective [[knowledge]]. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own [[consciousness]]. The [[world]] that appears is only a [[representation (psychology)|representation]] or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our [[mind]].
 
Schopenhauer's history is an account of the [[concept]] of the "ideal" in its meaning as "ideas in a subject's mind." In this sense, "ideal" means "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image." He does not refer to the other meaning of "ideal" as being qualities of the highest perfection and excellence. In his ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word "idealism" by calling it a "term with multiple meanings."
 
{{Quotation|[T]rue philosophy must at all costs be ''idealistic''; indeed, it must be so merely to be honest. For nothing is more certain than that no one ever came out of himself in order to identify himself immediately with things different from him; but everything of which he has certain, sure, and therefore immediate knowledge, lies within his consciousness. Beyond this consciousness, therefore, there can be no ''immediate'' certainty … .
There can never be an existence that is objective absolutely and in itself; such an existence, indeed, is positively inconceivable. For the objective, as such, always and essentially has its existence in the consciousness of a subject; it is therefore the subject's representation, and consequently is conditioned by the subject, and moreover by the subject's forms of representation, which belong to the subject and not to the object.|''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. II, Ch. 1}}
 
It is evident that Schopenhauer's "idealism" is based primarily on considerations having to do with the relation between our ideas and external reality, rather than being based (like Plato's, Plotinus's, or Hegel's "idealism") on considerations having to do with the nature of reality as such.
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==== Brittiläinen idealismi ====