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[[Platon]]ia pidetään usein idealistina, koska hänen [[ideaoppi]]nsa keskeisenä osana olevat ideat ovat selvästi laajasti ymmärrettynä ''ideaalisia''. Platonille keskeistä ei kuitenkaan ollut se, että nämä ideat olisivat ihmismielessä, vaan niillä oli hänelle itsenäinen olemassaolo.<ref name="OCP-Idealism"/><ref>Platon: ''Parmenides'' 132b3-c8</ref> Näin Platon ei ole esimerkiksi subjektiivinen idealisti kuten Berkeley. Sen sijaan häntä voidaan pitää ensimmäisenä [[objektiivinen idealismi|objektiivisena idealistina]].<ref name="Klein">{{Verkkoviite | Osoite=http://www.philosophos.com/knowledge_base/archives_12/philosophy_questions_12.html | Tekijä=Klein, Simone | Nimeke=Objective idealism | Julkaisu=PhiloSophos.com | Viitattu=12. syyskuuta 2007}}</ref> Platonin ajatukset saivat vaikutteita myös idealistina pidetyltä [[Parmenides|Parmenideelta]].<ref>{{Verkkoviite | Osoite=http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DPF.CHAP32.HTM | Tekijä=Rummel, R. J. | Nimeke=A Humanism Between Materialism And Idealism | Julkaisu=Understanding Conflict ans War | Viitattu=12. syyskuuta 2007}}</ref> Platonin idealismi asetetaan usein [[Aristoteles|Aristoteleen]] [[realismi (ontologia)|realismia]] vastaan.<ref name="CE-Idealism">{{Verkkoviite | Osoite=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07634a.htm | Nimeke=Idealism | Julkaisu=Catholic Encyclopedia | Viitattu=12. syyskuuta 2007}}</ref>
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Plato's [[Allegory of the Cave]] is sometimes interpreted as drawing attention to the problem of knowing "external objects"--the problem that concerned Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and other modern philosophers. But the Forms that the Cave-dwellers are ignorant of aren't "external" to them in the way that material objects are for these modern thinkers. The Forms are the true realities, but they aren't spatially outside us, as material objects are. So the issue that Plato's allegory addresses--which is, roughly, how can we know what is truly real (and truly good)?--is quite different from the modern issue of our knowledge of the "external world."
However, even if Plato doesn't share the specific concerns of modern philosophy, and of George Berkeley, in particular, Plato could still be a ''non-subjective'' idealist. He could believe that matter has no independent existence, or that full "reality" (as distinct from mere existence) is achieved only through thought. Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have maintained that Greek philosophers never conceived of idealism as an option, because they lacked Descartes's conception of an independently existing mind.<ref>Bernard Williams, "Philosophy," in M.I. Finley, ed., ''The Legacy of Greece: A New Appraisal'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 204-5; and Myles Burnyeat, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed," ''Philosophical Review'' 91 (1982), pp. 3-40.</ref> But Williams and Burnyeat didn't consider the possibility that Plato could have held an idealism like Kant's, which argues from the nature of knowledge to the nature of the objects of knowledge, or like Hegel's, which denies that matter is fully "real"--without (in either case) reducing material objects to ideas in a mind or minds.
The German Neo-Kantian scholar, Paul Natorp, argued in his ''Plato's Theory of Ideas. An Introduction to Idealism'' (first published in 1903)<ref>Paul Natorp, ''Plato's Theory of Ideas. An Introduction to Idealism'', edited with an introduction by Vasilis Politis, translated by Vasilis Politis and John Connolly (Sankt Augustin: Akademia, 2005).</ref> that Plato was a non-subjective, "transcendental" idealist, somewhat like Kant, and Natorp's thesis has received support from some recent scholars.<ref>See Vasilis Politis, "Non-Subjective Idealism in Plato (''Sophist'' 248e-249d)," and John Dillon, "The Platonic Forms as ''Gesetze'': Could Paul Natorp Have Been Right?", both in Stephen Gersh and Dermot Moran, eds., ''Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition'' (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).</ref>
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[[Plotinos|Plotinokselta]] voidaan löytää ensimmäistä kertaa länsimaisen filosofian historiassa samanlaista idealismia, jota oli jo paljon aikaisemmin esiintynyt itämaisessa ajattelussa.<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur: ''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Volume I, "Fragments for the History of Philosophy," § 7</ref><ref>Noiré, Ludwig: ''Historical Introduction to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'''</ref> Plotinos opetti, että kaikkeudessa ei ole muuta paikkaa kuin sielu, että sielu on tehnyt maailman astumalla iäisyydestä aikaan, ja että aikaa ei pidä olettaa sielun ulkopuolella.<ref>Plotinos: ''Enneadit'' iii, 7, 10</ref> Monien myöhempien filosofien tavoin Plotinos ei kuitenkaan ollut huolissaan siitä, kuinka voisimme tuntea mielemme ulkopuoliset oliot.
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